Today, we are releasing GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol, the most capable models we have deployed externally to date.
Both models meet the Critical threshold for Cybersecurity capabilities and the High threshold for Biological and Chemical capabilities under our Preparedness Framework [1]. GPT-6.2 Astra meets the High threshold for AI Self-Improvement capabilities, while GPT-6.2 Sol falls below it.
The most important things to know about the safety of this launch are as follows:
Our evaluations show that GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol are the most capable models we’ve released for cybersecurity tasks. Both were better than GPT-6 Astra and GPT-6.1 Sol at developing working exploits from known software vulnerabilities. In response, we tightened default restrictions on higher-risk cybersecurity assistance and require additional vetting for more permissive access.
GPT-6.2 Astra is our first externally released model to meet the High threshold for AI Self-Improvement. Before expanding GPT-6.2 Astra’s internal use in Codex, we evaluated its alignment and verified that the safeguards required for each stage were in place. We also improved isolation in our research environments, significantly expanded monitoring of frontier agents, and introduced Control Room, a central system that tracks model workloads across our research infrastructure and can stop them quickly when safety or security concerns arise.
Both models performed similarly to GPT-6 Astra on most alignment evaluations, particularly those measuring agentic workloads, but were more likely to omit known obstacles when reporting their work. Improvements on alignment evaluations were most pronounced for evaluations using simulated realistic workplace tasks; in those evaluations, GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol took improper actions about half as often as their respective predecessors. We saw regressions on model-only evaluations that measure models’ propensity not to disclose obstacles they encountered in their work. The Codex developer prompt substantially reduces these omissions across the evaluations that test for them. We take these regressions seriously and are investigating what might have contributed to them.
We adjusted both models’ refusal boundaries for high-risk requests after observing regressions in jailbreak resistance. In initial model-level evaluations, both GPT-6.2 models refused fewer harmless requests than their predecessors but were less resistant to jailbreaks than GPT-6 Astra. After the adjustment, both models improved on follow-up static jailbreak tests. On our static jailbreak evaluations, both GPT-6.2 models withheld unsafe assistance more often than GPT-6 Astra on cybersecurity prompts, but still regressed slightly compared to GPT-6 Astra on high-risk biology prompts.
GPT-6.2 Astra showed more signs of evaluation awareness than GPT-6 Astra. In evaluations that replayed internal Codex sessions, GPT-6.2 Astra was more likely than GPT-6 Astra to express suspicion that it was being tested or was in a simulation. GPT-6.2 Astra’s reasoning also more often suggested that it might change its behavior in response to being evaluated. Signs of this tendency were flagged in fewer than 3 percent of turns. By contrast, GPT-6.2 Sol expressed a lower rate of evaluation awareness than GPT-6 Astra and GPT-6.1 Sol.
Compared with GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.2 Astra is better at evading chain of thought (CoT) monitoring in some tests. When we asked the models to carry out a hidden task and evade detection (adversarial tests), we found that GPT-6.2 Astra is better at evading CoT monitoring, especially at lower reasoning efforts, for unguided settings. However, successful sabotage or sandbox escape rarely went undetected when the monitor could also see their actions. When models weren’t asked to hide their behavior (non-adversarial tests), both GPT-6.2 models wrote shorter reasoning traces than GPT-6 Astra at their lowest tested effort settings and were harder to monitor from those traces alone.
We strengthened our protections against unauthorized distillation. To reduce the risk that distillation attacks could transfer capabilities to other models without carrying over our safeguards, we’ve strengthened the defenses we have in place against unauthorized distillation. These additional safeguards include protections for encrypted reasoning and added checks that can hold streamed responses if they might expose private model reasoning. In our adaptive red-teaming evaluations, attempts to extract private reasoning for both earlier-turn and current-turn reasoning succeeded less than 1 percent of the time for GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol.
The rest of this system card describes our evaluations and safeguards in more detail.